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A bstract
This paper studies a model of a stock market with noise traders, 
building on earlier work of De Long et al.; the market is open at discrete 
points in time; when the market is closed, fictional trade takes place. As 
fictional trade takes place, traders learn the returns to rational and noise 
trading as depending on the distribution of rational and noise traders 
in the population. This in turn changes the distribution of types; the 
process goes on until a stationary distribution is reached. Conditions for 
the eventual permanence of noise traders in equilibrium are given, both 
in a static (evolutionary stability) and in a dynamic (replicator dynam­
ics) evolutionary framework. It is found that a dynamic evolutionary 
analysis leads to substantial improvements on existing results.
*Address: Pier Luigi Sacco, Dept, of Economics, European University 






















































































































































































Noise traders permanence in stock markets: 
A tâtonnement approach. I: Informational 
Dynamics for the two- dimensional case*
1. In troduction .
In a series of papers, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(DSSW henceforth) study a model of a stock market in which there 
are both rational traders, who form their price expectations accurately 
according to fundamentals, and noise traders, who misperceive funda­
mental values [see DSSW (1989, 1990a,b, 1991)]. Among other things, 
DSSW investigate the conditions under which noise traders can survive 
in the stock market. Surprisingly enough, they show that there are 
cases in which noise traders do survive and even prosper, contrary to 
the classical thesis of Friedman (1953) that only the rational stay in 
the market in the long run. DSSW (1991) is in particular entirely de­
voted to the question of the survival of noise traders. The pathbreaking 
contributions of DSSW, however, are admittedly just a scratch on the 
surface of this question, which has several facets and is technically very 
demanding. The central point is the following: If noise traders misper­
ceive fundamentals and constitute a relatively ‘large’ part of the market, 
they create distortions on market prices. Therefore, a dynamic model of 
price determination for a stock market in which a substantial number of 
noise traders is active must explain how the effect of the noise traders’ 
misperceptions on prices interacts with the changes in the wealth and 
(possibly) in the number of noise traders as time unfolds. A satisfactory 
theoretical treatment of the issue requires that the model be embedded 
in a full-blown dynamic general equilibrium framework. In the absence
*1 would like to thank David Easley and Mark Salmon for useful con­
versations and Richard Day, Alan Kirman, Robert Waldmann and two 
anonymous referees of this journal for very effective comments and sug­
gestions on earlier drafts. Partial financial support from a ”G. Mortara” 





























































































of such a framework, DSSW must limit their attention to the analysis 
of the long run distribution of wealth under the assumption that noise 
traders do not affect market prices.
As DSSW (1991) themselves suggest, an evolutionary analysis is 
one of the most promising routes to take in the quest for the best the­
oretical model of noise trading. The easiest move in this direction is to 
adopt a static approach, namely to study the evolutionary stability of 
noise trading. An evolutionary stable state (ESS) is a distribution of 
types across the population that cannot be successfully invaded by any 
small proportion of ‘mutant’ individuals. These types are identified by 
the strategies adopted by their members when interacting with other 
members of the population. Invoking evolutionary stability as a solu­
tion concept has an obvious advantage but also an obvious shortcoming 
if compared to a fully dynamic evolutionary analysis. The advantage is 
that, given the static nature of the notion of evolutionary stability, one 
can dispense with the difficult problem of the impact of noise traders on 
the price dynamics. On the other hand, this kind of analysis says little 
about the existence of a dynamic process through which an ESS can be 
reached starting from a certain set of initial conditions. Moreover, the 
real trouble with evolutionary stability is that, in the polymorphic case 
in which two or more population types coexist in equilibrium (as it is 
in the DSSW model if noise traders do not disappear but also do not 
invade the market completely), the ESS is quite fragile w.r.t. perturba­
tions that involve equilibrium, rather than mutant, strategies: All those 
population types which are observed at the ESS must receive the same 
payoff; therefore, if a slight perturbation of the equilibrium proportion 
of types across the population occurs for whatever reason, there is no 
force pushing the population back to the ESS, since no individual in the 
population suffers a loss from abandoning his(her) equilibrium strategy 
for any other one which is played with positive frequence at the ESS. 
On the other hand, if the distribution of types is not the one dictated 
by the ESS, there is now the possibility that some ‘mutant’ type can 
successfully invade the population. These two facts together call for a 
dynamic analysis that explicitely derives the conditions under which a 
given distribution of types is a stable stationary state1.




























































































When the static framework of evolutionary stability is substituted 
by a dynamic one, based for example on the so called replicator dynam­
ics (according to which a type’ s size within the population increases if 
and only if the type earns a return that is greater than the average one), 
one can sometimes find that there are attractors for the dynamics that 
do not correspond to ESSs, and, conversely, that ESSs may not be stable 
stationary states for the dynamics* 2. When this occurs, it is reasonable 
to expect that a dynamic evolutionary analysis provides richer insights 
than a static one. Therefore, once having committed oneself to an evo­
lutionary justification of noise trading, there may be a large return to a 
dynamic evolutionary analysis; although technically more demanding, 
a dynamic analysis is likely to provide more complete answers to the 
issue of the permanence of noise traders than a static one.
This is in fact the case in the present paper. We adopt an evolu­
tionary dynamic framework, based on the replicator dynamics, which 
has a tractable level of analytical difficulty and nevertheless allows to 
make clear cut predictions on the equilibrium distribution of rational 
and noise traders. This is of course done at the cost of some simplifica­
tions, that seem however to retain many important features of a realistic 
stock market dynamics.
The plan of the paper is the following: In section 2 we provide a 
brief informal survey of the results of DSSW and of related work, provide 
a detailed description of our approach and explain to what extent our 
results improve upon, or differ from, the available ones. In section 3 
we give a detailed exposition of the DSSW (1990b), which will be the 
basis of our own model. In section 4 we give an analytical discussion 
of evolutionary stability as applied to the DSSW model. In section 5 
our dynamic model, as well as our main results, are presented. Section 
6 is devoted to the interpretation of our results. Section 7 concludes. 
Proofs of the results are given in the Appendix.
2. C om parison w ith  related work.
e.g. in Vega Redondo (1988).




























































































The issue of the relative performance of noise and rational traders 
is explicitely tackled in DSSW (1990b), (1991). In DSSW (1990b), the 
authors study an overlapping generations model where agents live two 
periods; when young, they must make a portfolio choice between a safe 
and a risky asset (say, a stock). This is the only decision they must make 
during their lifetime; when old, traders simply consume their wealth. 
The two assets yield the same dividend; however, while the former is 
in perfectly elastic supply, the latter is in fixed supply. Moreover, the 
price of the stock is subject to misperception by noise traders; this is in 
fact the only reason why the stock is risky: In the absence of misper­
ceptions, it would be a safe one as well. The agents’ horizon is short; 
therefore, they cannot wait to recover a capital loss. Noise traders may 
have higher expected returns than rational traders if they axe ‘bullish’ 
(i.e. if their misperception of the price has positive sign), but at the 
cost of lower expected utility because of their riskier portfolios. This 
means that a noise trader may end up wealthier than a rational one, 
but also that (s)he runs a substantial risk to end up quite poor. In 
order to determine how the proportion of noise traders changes over 
time, DSSW assume that, although in principle a new rational and a 
new noise trader, respectively, is born for each one dead, in each period 
a small fraction of newly born traders changes its type to imitate the 
strategy that looks more successful in terms of expected returns. It is 
crucial that the number of switchers be small in any period because 
traders should otherwise take into account how the change in the dis­
tribution of types affects returns, and this would make the solution of 
the model considerably more difficult. Under this assumption, it can 
be shown that either the proportion of noise traders tends to zero in 
the long run, or the market is eventually all made up of noise traders, 
according to whether the initial proportion of noise traders is above or 
below a certain critical value. If one assumes that the stock has fun­
damentally risky returns, it can be shown that the eventual proportion 
of noise traders has a lower bound which is strictly positive —that is, 
noise traders are never driven out of the market completely. It must 
be emphasized, however, that this model is not able to determine how 
the distribution of wealth between the two types of traders changes over 
time.




























































































with infinitely lived agents who make consumption and portfolio choices. 
Portfolio choices concern a safe asset and a continuum of risky assets 
(say, stocks). There is a continuum of different types of noise traders, 
each one misperceiving the return of a single stock. The subject of the 
misperception may be mean returns, the variance of returns, or both; the 
magnitude of the misperception is the same across all types of traders. 
Misperceptions of the variance turn out to be the crucial element of the 
model. It is moreover assumed that the presence of noise traders does 
not affect asset prices; this implies that in this model noise traders do not 
exhibit the typical ‘buy high-sell low’ pattern of behavior, but merely 
tend to invest an excessive share of their wealth in the asset which is 
subject to misperception. Under these assumptions, it turns out that 
noise traders who misperceive only the variance of returns of one asset 
have higher expected returns than rational investors. Moreover, for any 
configuration of the parameters of the distribution of asset returns, there 
is a range of values of the variance misperception parameter centered 
around one (i.e., no variance misperception) for which noise traders’ 
aggregate wealth is larger than rational traders’ aggregate wealth; in 
other words, noise traders not only survive in the long run, but also 
dominate rational traders in wealth, in spite of the fact that they tend to 
overestimate the returns of their portfolios and therefore to consume too 
much. It is also found, however, that if rational traders have logarithmic 
utility, then no type of noise trader may dominate rational traders in 
wealth.
There are other interesting models in the literature that study the 
relative performance of rational and nonrational traders in asset mar­
kets. Day and Huang (1991) propose a deterministic model of a stock 
market where three types of agents are active: sophisticated investors 
(a-investors in their terminology), naive investors (/3-investors) and 
market makers, a-investors exploit information optimally in order to 
estimate the long-run fundamental value of the stock, which is their ref­
erence price. They also estimate a topping and a bottoming price for the 
stock; these are ‘no trespassing’ points for the realization of the specu­
lative gains of a-investors. Beyond these points, the likelihood that the 
upward or downward drift, respectively, of the stock price is reverted is 
too high; a sophisticated investor will therefore liquidate his(her) posi­




























































































their decisions on simple extrapolative rules based on past price trends. 
They will therefore tend to buy high and sell low like noise traders of 
DSSW (1990b). On the other hand, their expectations will be grossly 
confirmed unless the market price is near a turning point, i.e., a topping 
or bottoming price. Market makers are the third type of agents. They 
are ready to sell to or buy from other market participants any quantity 
of the stock at a price set by them and updated at discrete intervals. 
Market makers adjust price much like a Walrasian auctioneer, raising 
it when there is excess demand and lowering it when there is excess 
supply. This is a realistic description of market makers’ behavior in ac­
tual asset markets. On the basis of these assumptions, Day and Huang 
show that their deterministic model can display any kind of complex 
behavior, from cycles to bifurcations to chaos; as a result, the generated 
sequences of stock prices may be so erratic to be indistinguishable from 
series generated by a stochastic process. Of course, the kind of dynam­
ics generated by the model depends on the behavioral parameters of 
the three types of agents; the crucial conditions for the appearance of 
complex dynamics are that /3-investors must be very active in the prox­
imity of the long run fundamental value of the stock (in order to prevent 
convergence) and that a investors must be very reactive in the proxim­
ity of the topping and bottoming values (this gives rise to intermittent 
phases of bear and bull markets; typically, erratic price behavior will be 
observed within each phase).
Kirman (1991a,b) presents a model of an asset market in which, 
following Frankel and Froot (1986), there are two types of agents: Fun­
damentalists, who forecast next period’ s price on the basis of mar­
ket fundamentals, and chartists, who use simple adaptive extrapolation 
rules; there is a clear analogy with the rational/noise traders dichotomy 
of DSSW. Kirman assumes that any individual in the population of 
traders may change its type with a given (small) probability. Moreover, 
traders meet at random several times between two market sessions; at 
each meeting, one of the traders can be ‘converted’ to the other trader’ 
s type with a given probability. As a result of these assumptions, the 
proportion of traders’ types in the market evolves as a Markov chain 
and the best forecast of the asset’ s price for the next period is the 
one dictated by the majority view. In other words, if most traders 




























































































are induced to change their type if they believe that the majority of 
traders is of the other type, and this fact is common knowledge; the 
proportion of types is only imperfectly observable, however. It can be 
shown that with a large number of traders, for suitable choices of the 
transition probabilities, the density of the proportion of traders’ types 
tends to a symmetric, bimodal beta distribution; consequently, one can 
observe intermittent phases of ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘chartist’ markets. 
Simulations of the model show that the presence of chartists does not 
necessarily imply an increase in the instability of the price of the asset 
around the fundamental value, and that there are even cases in which 
it has a stabilizing effect on the price.
Finally, Blume and Easley (1989) consider a model of an asset mar­
ket where there are H  assets whose relative dividends are state depen­
dent. In spite of the fact that assets’ payoffs have a stochastic nature, 
relative payoffs are deterministic. Each trader has a subjective proba­
bility distribution on the states of nature. The model is defined over an 
infinite sequence of periods. At each period traders choose how to allo­
cate their wealth between consumption and assets. Blume and Easley 
are interested in the long run distribution of wealth across traders, much 
like DSSW (1991). They show that, if all traders have identical savings 
rates, the trader who (almost surely) eventually dominates in wealth all 
other traders is the one whose beliefs are closest in relative entropy to 
the true probability distribution of states. In other words, with equal 
savings rates the market selects for the ‘most rational’ investor. If, how­
ever, savings rates differ across traders, eventual dominance in wealth 
depends not only on traders’ rationality (as defined above) but also on 
their relative savings ratios. More specifically, it may be the case that 
the ‘most rational’ trader is eventually driven out of the market by a 
less rational trader if the highest relative entropy of the latter’ s beliefs 
w.r.t. the true probability distribution is more than compensated by 
a substantially lower savings rate. In other words, the market may se­
lect for (relatively) nonrational traders if these are substantially stingier 
than (relatively) more rational traders and if their beliefs do not depart 
too much from rational beliefs.
Our brief survey clearly shows that each of the models listed above 
is concerned with a potentially important facet of stock market dynam­




























































































in the proportion of behavioral types and the role of imitative behav­
ior; Day and Huang point out the importance of a realistic description 
of market institutions for the understanding of the price dynamics and 
focus on dynamic complexity and intermittent phases of bull and bear 
markets, a characteristic partly explored also by Kirman; DSSW (1991) 
and Blume and Easley study the long run distribution of wealth between 
rational and nonrational traders. It is also apparent, however, that the 
theoretical frameworks under which the various models are built are 
too different to allow for a meaningful comparison of results. These two 
considerations point in the same direction, namely, the necessity of a 
more general model which can address the issues posed by the today 
available models within a common (necessarily broader) framework.
The model presented in this paper aims at being a first step in this 
direction. It has been conceived as a part of a more general model which 
should allow one to study the dynamics of the proportion of behavioral 
types, of wealth shares and of stock market prices all together. We give 
an idea of our general model below. Subsequently, we identify the part 
of the model which is actually introduced in the present paper and show 
how our results improve upon some of the already available ones.
Our approach to the modelling of stock market dynamics could be 
labelled a ‘tâtonnement’ one. Market dynamics is defined over an in­
finite sequence of periods. We focus our attention on a given couple 
of periods, say periods t and t + 1, and investigate how the observed 
information on the returns to rational and noise trading between these 
two periods affects the proportion of types. The mechanism works as 
follows. Market outcomes for period t are given, as well as the real­
ization of the noise traders’ misperception for period t. Then a new 
generation of traders, who will trade at time t + 1, is born, whereas old 
traders die (after having consumed their wealth). It is assumed that, 
at the birth time, traders belong to a certain type. There is no nec­
essary relationship between the type of old traders dying and that of 
the newly born traders; the number of births and deaths are equal for 
simplicity, however. The birth of new traders and the disappearance of 
the old ones will bring about a perturbation in the distribution of types 
(as well as in the distribution of the noisy stock between types), thus 
altering the returns to rational and noise trading, respectively. Traders 




























































































open, however. Traders are free to undertake off-the-market transac­
tions at fictional prices, which are set by an auctioneer in the standard 
way. Off-the-market transactions cannot be binding, i.e., traders can­
not sign contracts if the market is closed. In spite of this, off-the-market 
transactions can be very useful to traders, who use them to learn how 
the relative performance of rational and noise trading depends on the 
current distribution of types and exploit this information during market 
transactions. The informational dynamics generated by fictional trade is 
the following: By observing the dynamics of (expected) returns, traders 
may decide to change their type; this changes the distribution of types 
and therefore affects (expected) returns, and so on. This dynamic pro­
cess is modelled as a replicator dynamics, i.e., the rate of change of the 
proportion of traders of a given type is equal to the difference between 
the expected return to the corresponding strategy and the average ex­
pected return3. The process goes on until no trader has an incentive to 
change his(her) decision through the observation of returns, i.e., until 
the dynamics converges to a stationary point. To emphasize its notional 
character, the informational dynamics happens in continuous time.
There is a basic difference between our replicator dynamics and the 
imitative dynamics of DSSW (1990b), namely, that in the DSSW model 
population dynamics is driven by the difference between types’ expected 
returns, independently of the types’ size in the population, whereas in 
our model it is driven by the difference between the expected return to 
each type and the average expected return, which clearly depends on the 
types’ size; this latter fact creates a more complex relationship between 
types’ returns and their size in the population than in the DSSW model, 
and accounts for the richer dynamic behavior of our model. Another
3This aspect of our model has clear connections with the Kirman model. 
As in the Kirman model, in our model there is no necessary link be­
tween noise trading and bounded rationality. The same trader may 
switch from noise to rational trading and vice versa according to the 
dynamics of returns. On the other hand, the assumptions of our model 
clash with the efficient markets paradigm and more generally with the 
approach that sees individuals as exclusively concerned with the infor­
mation about fundamental values [see e.g. Lucas (1986) and the critical 




























































































important difference is that in our model we do not impose any exoge­
nous restriction on the rate at which traders may switch their type. 
Finally, it must be reminded that ours is a continuous time dynamic 
model, whereas DSSW (1990b) is a discrete time one.
Once the informational dynamics has come to rest, the noise 
traders’ misperception at time t + 1, pt+i, is observed and the mar­
ket is opened for period t + 1. The actual proportion of rational and 
noise traders at this stage is the result of the informational dynamics 
that took place previously. It is an ex ante equilibrium proportion: 
When the market opens, every trader is happy about his(her) type4 
and transactions take place; the market clearing price is found and the 
equilibrium holdings of the stock for the two types are determined. The 
same story can now be told again for periods t+ 1, t+2 and so on. To get 
a concise picture of the timing of traders’ actions, one can imagine that 
markets are opened only on ‘Monday’, a second after the current noise 
traders’ misperception has been observed; on ‘Tuesday’, old traders con­
sume their wealth; on ‘Wednesday’, old traders die and new traders are 
born; fictitious trade happens all over the other days of the week5.
The fictitious nature of off -the-market transactions explains our 
reference to tâtonnement. Three important characteristics of our model 
need to be stressed. First, the distribution of types and market prices 
are determined separately. This allows us to study the changes in the 
proportion of traders’ types without being concerned with their effect 
on stock prices; conversely, stock prices are determined once the equi­
4 The observation of pr+1 could in principle create new incentives for 
traders to change their type. As the market opens, however, transac­
tions take place very rapidly and traders have no time to exploit this 
new piece of information. Of course, the noise traders’ misperception at 
f +  1 has an effect on realized returns at t + 1, the observation of which 
may disappoint traders of a certain type, but cannot modify their port­
folio choices, which have already been made. In a more realistic model 
where traders live several periods and make several portfolio choices dur­
ing their lifetime, realized returns would affect their portfolio decisions 
in the next period.
sThis aspect of the model is reminescent of the Hicksian temporary 




























































































librium proportion of types for the current period has been determined. 
We can therefore in principle avoid the restrictive assumptions of DSSW 
(1990b) and (1991) (respectively, that only a small number of traders 
changes type in each period and that noise traders do not affect stock 
prices) and determine both the proportion of traders’ types and the 
distribution of wealth across types within the same model. Second, 
our model has both a deterministic and a stochastic nature. The main 
stochastic element of the model is the evolution of noise traders’ misper­
ceptions with their effect on prices and therefore on the distribution of 
wealth; the main deterministic element is the informational dynamics 
which takes place between market periods. This characteristic of the 
model allows us a joint treatment of the stochastic and deterministic 
sources of dynamic complexity of stock market prices. Third, the con­
traposition of actual market transactions and off the market notional 
transactions allows us to introduce an element of realism in the model, 
which, however, still scores poorly as a credible description of market 
institutions. This is in our opinion one of the weaknesses of our model; 
the introduction of traders who play the role of market makers, as in 
the Day and Huang model, would make it much more general.
In the present paper, we study only one aspect of the general model, 
namely, the informational dynamics between a given couple of market 
sessions. Our model exploits the basic architecture of DSSW (1990b). 
Given the role played by the informational dynamics within the more 
general model, that is, the determination of the equilibrium proportion 
of traders’ types, the results we obtain are meaningfully comparable 
only with those of DSSW (1990b) and, although quite partially, with 
those of Kirman, i.e., with the papers which address more or less the 
same issue6. A more global evaluation of our model must be left for 
future research.
Our results are the following.
A first set of results, actually the most important, concerns our 
dynamic evolutionary model. It is found that both rational and noise
6It is interesting to observe that the actual behavior of our model is 
the product of the interplay of its deterministic and stochastic parts; 
although the dynamics is deterministic, its parameters are stochastically 




























































































traders may be the only type observed in the market in equilibrium, 
the actual type observed depending on the current noise traders’ mis­
perception; however, there is also the possibility that rational and noise 
traders coexist in equilibrium. This is an improvement w.r.t. DDSW 
(1990b) where the two types could coexist in equilibrium only in the 
presence of a fundamentally risky asset. Moreover, it is also shown 
that the stability of a given stationary proportion of types crucially de­
pends on the relative shares of the stock owned by the two types, and 
therefore, on the distribution of wealth. Interestingly enough, there are 
ranges of values of noise traders’ misperceptions for which all members 
of the type which initially holds the majority of the stock are converted 
to the other type in equilibrium7. Finally, whereas in DSSW (1990b) 
noise traders cannot be observed in equilibrium if their misperceptions 
are bearish, in our dynamic model bearish noise traders will indeed be 
the only type observed in equilibrium if they initially hold the majority 
of the noisy stock.
The second set of results concerns what we could call the (com­
parative) statics of our model, and more specifically the evolutionary 
stability of the equilibrium distributions of types. It is found that the 
stable stationary equilibria of our dynamic model are not necessarily 
ESSs, although they are the only feasible candidates for an ESS. In 
fact, it turns out that our dynamic analysis provides much finer pre­
dictions on the actual proportion of rational and noise traders that will 
be observed in equilibrium than the ESS conditions do. As a matter 
of fact, a static evolutionary analysis does not lead to any substantial 
improvement upon the original results of DSSW (1990b).
Lastly, as far as the Kirman model is concerned, our results suggest 
that traders of different types can coexist in equilibrium even when 
the proportion of types is perfectly observable; in the Kirman model, 
this latter assumption would imply that, in equilibrium, all traders are 
converted to the majority type. It must however be emphasized once 
again that our assumptions are not close enough to those of Kirman to
7In fact, when the stock is equally distributed between the two types, the 
tâtonnement dynamics does not operate and the equilibrium proportion 




























































































make our results really comparable8 9.
3. B asic architecture o f th e model: T he D S S W  (1990b)
m odel.
Our model builds on DSSW (1990b). The basic assumptions of 
the model have been described in section 2. We consider for simplicity 
the version of the model without fundamental risk. Thus we have two 
stocks, both of which have a fundamental value equal to one and pay 
a fixed real dividend equal to r in the absence of misperception. No 
stock has intrinsic risk. One of the stocks, however, is subject to the 
misperceptions of noise traders (the noisy stock). Misperceptions are 
assumed to be i.i.d and to have a normal distribution, with mean J) and
• 99variance ap
The price at time t of the noisy stock is pt. The share of the noisy 
stock held by noise traders at time t is /?”, the share held by rational 
traders at t is /3tr = 1 — /3™.
Each trader maximizes his(her) expected utility and has constant 
absolute risk aversion10. Stationarity of pt implies prices are stationary.
8 More specifically, traders in the Kirman model need to make more 
sophisticated calculations than traders in our model do.
9In a really satisfactory model of stock market dynamics, the evolution 
of noise traders’ misperceptions should be endogenously determined in 
order to derive a truly realistic correlation pattern across periods. We 
do not pursue this point in the current formulation of the model to keep 
technical difficulties at a manageable level; this is however an important 
extension of the model that should eventually be made. We are grateful 
to a referee for pointing this out.
10It must be emphasized here that the assumption of constant absolute 
risk aversion implies that our tâtonnement dynamics does not depend 
on the distribution of wealth across the economy. This would of course 
no longer be the case with different utility functions; traders would have 
to maximize a nonlinear function of the returns, and this would change 
the dynamics considerably, at the cost of a decrease in the analytical 




























































































Of course, individual calculations are conditioned on next period’ s ex­
pected price. Let W* be the expected final wealth for a trader, let a\v 
be the associated variance and let 6 be the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion. Then the individual maximization problem boils down to [see 
DSSW (1990b), p. 708]
maxw W* -  6a2w ( 1 )
The return for both noise traders, R ", and rational traders, 7?.[, is 
given by
Rt = Pt[r + Pt+i -  (1 + r)pt] (2)
where = /?" for noise traders, f3t — fi\ for rational traders, and 
(1 + r)pt is the opportunity cost of giving up holding the safe stock. 
The maximization problem for a noise trader is
max W  +  Et(R?) +  f t p t -  6((3?)2o2p (3)
Pt
where Et{-) denotes the expectation taken at time t, W  is the amount 
of wealth that is independent of portfolio decisions (i.e., labour income 
earned when young), and a2 is the expected variance of price, which is 
equal across periods given the stationarity assumption.
The /3™pt term in (3) is due to the noise trader’ s misperceptions 
of the return on noisy stock. For each unit of the noisy stock the noise 
trader believes (s)he will receive an extra return of pt. pt may be nega­
tive.
For a rational trader one has
max W  +  E t { R \ ) - m ) 2° l  (4)Pt
The first order conditions for (3) and (4) yield
0? =
r +  E t (pt-i-i) -  (1 +  r )p t +  pt
2






























































































respectively11. The misperceptions of noise traders lead them to buy 
more, or less, of the noisy stock than rational traders at t depending on 
the sign of pt.
The proportion of noise traders in the economy at the end of time 
t is p. Imposition of the market clearing condition /3[ + /3" = 1 implies
Pt




2 _  P ° PG„ =
P ( l + r ) 2
[see e.g. DSSW (1990b), p. 711], one has that
(6)
( 7)
. p(Pt -  P) , P P _  26^ l  
* 1 -f r r r(l -f r)2 ( 8)
There are three factors that affect how noise traders cause the price 
of the noisy stock to deviate from its fundamental value: a) the vari­
ability of noise traders’ misperceptions, whose effect on price depends 
on the proportion of noise traders in the economy; b) the direct impact 
of the average misperception on the price (i.e. the systematic price dis­
tortion caused by noise trading); note that, things being equal, a high 
price for the noisy stock raises the opportunity cost from not holding 
the safe asset; and c) the risk premium for holding the noisy stock when 
noise traders are present. The presence of noise traders increases the 
expected return from holding the noisy stock, although at the cost of 
increased price risk. This situations reminds somewhat the inception of 
bubbles in asset markets. For a detailed discussion of the interpretation 
of the various components of the pricing function (8) see [DSSW (1990b; 
pp. 711-13)]. We will return on the interpretation of the DSSW model 
in section 6 where we discuss our results.
4. ESSs for th e D SSW  (1990b) m odel.
11 Note that under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion 




























































































Consider a ‘large’ population of individuals who are to play a cer­
tain game Q. Let E be the set of available strategies (the same for all 
individuals) and let L(E) be the corresponding set of frequence distri­
butions over E. Let us identify each strategy in E with a population 
type; that is, individual i is of type h if (s)he plays strategy h. The 
expected payoff function tt(-, t [']) : ^  x -£(£) —̂* 5ft of Q is defined as 
follows. Let i be a player drawn from the population and let 7 £ L(E) 
be the strategy profile played by the various members of the popula­
tion other than i. Since the population is ‘large’, the strategy choice 
of i has a negligible impact on the overall distribution of strategies. If, 
say, only two distinct strategies / ,  g are played in the population with 
positive frequence (equivalently, only two types / ,  g are present in the 
population), the notation 7[(1 — e) • /  © e • g] means that a proportion 
1 — e of the population is playing / ,  while a proportion e is playing g 
(i.e., a fraction 1 — e of the population is of type /  and a fraction e is of 
type g). The expected payoff from playing strategy h when 7 [-] is the 
distribution of strategies (types) across the population is defined as a 
function of h and 7 and is given by 7r(/r,7[-])12.
A distribution A £ L(E) is an evolutionary stable state if, for any 
/  £ E for which A(/) = 0, there exists an interval £ — (0, e*] such that, 
for all e £ £, and for all h, h' such that A(h) > 0, A(h') > 0, one has13
El) 7r(/i,7 [(1  -  e) • A © e • /]) =  7[(1 -  e) • A ® e • /]);
E2) n(h, 7[(1 -  e) • A ® e ■ /]) > tt(/, 7[(1 -  e) • A ® e • /]).
In other words, all strategies which are played with positive probability 
in the ESS must yield the same expected payoffs (otherwise it would pay 
for individuals adopting less profitable strategies to switch to the more 
profitable strategy), and all strategies which are played with zero prob­
ability in the ESS must yield strictly inferior payoffs14. The rationale
12In the terminology of Maynard Smith (1982), these assumptions cor­
respond to a ‘playing the field’ interaction structure.
13 If at the ESS all strategies in E are played with positive frequence, 
condition E2 has to be suitably modified. See section 1 of the Appendix.
14If we allow for mixed strategies, the definition of an ESS can be made 




























































































behind the formal definition is the following. An ESS is a distribution of 
types across the population such that no ‘mutant’ type can successfully 
invade the population. In other words, in an ESS no ‘small’ fraction of 
individuals has an incentive to abandon their equilibrium strategies for 
any other strategy which is played with zero frequence at the equilib­
rium, because any such strategy yields strictly inferior payoffs15.
As emphasized in section 1, however, an ESS is a potentially fragile 
situation; since all the strategies which have a positive frequence in 
the ESS yield the same expected payoff, every individual can abandon 
his(her) equilibrium strategy for any other equilibrium strategy (i.e., for 
any other strategy which is played with positive frequence at the ESS) 
without suffering from any loss. As long as this actually happens, the 
distribution of types is no longer the equilibrium one and there are now 
‘mutant’ types that can successfully invade the population.
In spite of its deficiencies, the ESS solution concept is an useful 
reference point for the analysis of issues of survival like the one we are 
interested in. One should look at the ESSs of the model as a sort of 
‘comparative statics’, with all the caveats of this kind of analysis [see 
Samuelson (1947)].
In this spirit, we study in this section the existence of ESSs for our 
version of the DSSW (1990b) model. Keeping in mind the description 
of the timing of our model as given in section 2, we must emphasize that 
since our fictional trade takes place after the end of the market session 
at time t, the current noise traders’ misperception pt is known when 
fictional trade begins; moreover, every trader knows it16. Let now ip be 
the strategy ‘play as a noise trader at f  and <p be the strategy ‘play as
our context to allow for players randomizing between rational and noise 
trading; therefore we confine our attention to pure strategies.
15ESS was introduced as a game-theoretic solution concept in theo­
retical biology by Maynard Smith (1982). See Crawford (1991) for a 
comprehensive discussion of its relevance for economic analysis.
16Leahy (1989) finds the conditions for ESSs for the DSSW (1990b) 
model under a different assumption, namely, that current noise traders’ 
misperceptions pt are not fixed when traders interact; rather, they are 
stochastic. This assumption implies a different timing of events than in 




























































































a rational trader at t \
We have the following results:
Proposition 1. Consider our version of the DSSW (1990b) model 
without systematic risk as presented in section 3. Then:
a) p. = 0 is always an ESS for every possible value of current noise 
traders’ misperceptions pt;
b) p =  1 is an ESS if and only if 0 < pt < 2<5<7̂ /(1 -f r)2;
c) no ‘mixed’ ESS fi exists, 0 < fi < 1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is reported in section 1 of the Appendix. 
Part a) of the Proposition says that rational trading is always evo- 
lutionarily stable. This means that no small fraction of noise traders 
can successfully invade a population of rational traders. The rationale 
behind the result is that if the population is made almost entirely of 
rational traders, the influence of noise traders on prices is too small to 
make noise trading profitable. Although interesting, this result does 
not by any means imply that noise trading will never be observed. In 
fact, the dynamic analysis of the next section will show that, for a wide 
range of parameter values, noise traders are observed in equilibrium, or 
even they are the only type observed, in spite of the intuitions provided 
by our comparative static analysis. Part b) of the Proposition says 
that noise trading is evolutionarily stable if noise traders are moder­
ately bullish. If noise traders’ misperceptions are bearish, a population 
of noise traders can be invaded by rational traders because bearish noise 
traders tend to hold a relatively small amount of the noisy stock w.r.t. 
rational traders and the returns to risk bearing are therefore mainly 
collected by rational traders [see also DSSW (1990b), sec. IIA]. If noise 
traders’ misperceptions are too bullish, a population of noise traders can 
be invaded by rational traders because the price of the noisy stock is 
now so high and so volatile that the (expected) return to noise trading 
is very small and nevertheless bullish noise traders tend to hold large 
amounts of the noisy stock and therefore to bear a considerable amount 
of risk, which is in itself very large. Part c) is self evident. It is worth 
to stress, however, that on the grounds of a purely static analysis there 




























































































5. T âton nem en t dynam ics.
A complete verbal description of the model, and in particular of 
its dynamic structure, has been given in section 2. The basic equations 
were given in section 3. Section 4 provided a static analysis of the model. 
We are now ready for the technical analysis of the dynamics.
From equation (2), we know that the return to noise traders at 
time t may be written as /3”(r + Et(pt+i) — Pt — rpt). Advancing (8) 
one period yields
rw 1 i , PP E t{Pt+l) -  1 + y  -  --77-^2
Given (8), this leads to
Et(pt+i) ~ Pt =
•(1 + r)2
V i p -  Pt)
1 + r
Substituting (10) and (8) into (2), one gets 
Rt = f tp [
while, similarly,
2 6pa2p
L(1 + r)2 Pt
r 2òuo2n
Rt = A > [ ( r ^ 2  -  pt]
The average return at time t, R t, is given by
(9)
( 1 0 )
(H )
( 12)
Rt — pRt + (1 -  p)Rrt (13)
Let f  (p) = — pt). It is easy to check that
Rt = -  f t )  + (14)
The replicator dynamics for our model is given by [compare e.g. 
Hofbauer and Sygmund (1988)]




























































































where // belongs to the one-dimensional (unit) simplex.
Substituting (11) and (14) into (15) and noting that (3\ = 1 — /?" 
one finds that
ii = Ml -  M)f(/i)(2/3t" -  1)
Letting now T(/t) = ìr(/x), we have
(16)
P -  /i2( i -  / w r  -  i)r(/x) (17)
By imposing the condition /x = 0 on (17), it follows that the replica­
tor dynamics (15) has /x = 0 as a stationary point with multiplicity two 
and /x = 1 as a stationary point with multiplicity one. Therefore, under 
the replicator dynamics both rational and noise trading can predomi­
nate in equilibrium. Moreover, since T(/i) is linear in p, the replicator 
dynamics has at most one more stationary point in the interior of the 
one-dimensional simplex, a point where one generically finds a mixed 
proportion of rational and noise traders, who therefore coexist in the 
market in period t + 1.
Setting T(//,) =  0 one easily finds that the interior stationary point 
is given by
P =
( l j f rfjH
2 Sal
(18)
where of course it must be that 0 < p < 1 .  It is easy to check 
that this restriction implies 0 < pt < 2&r2/( 1 + r)2. In particular, if 
Pt = (2<5<r2)/(l + r)2, p = 1; if pt = 0, p, = 0. 17
17As a technical note, we observe that although our replicator dynamics 
is given by a polynomial of degree 4 in /x, this does not belong to a 
versal unfolding of p4. The ttm'versal unfolding of //4 is in fact U(fi) = 
/x4 + a/i2 + bft [see e.g. Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973)]. This is an 
exoteric but technically precise way of saying, in the language of the 
analysis of structural stability, that one of the roots of our polinomial, 
more specifically fi = 0, is not a simple root but a root of multiplicity 
two, and that therefore our model has potentially one more stationary 
point p , other than p, belonging to the interior of the one-dimensional 
simplex; under the dynamics (17), it is however permanently ‘captured’ 




























































































Outside this range of values, p lies outside the one-dimensional 
simplex and no interior stationary point exists.
The dynamic behavior of the model can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. Let [3? < 1/2. Then:
a) if Pt < 0, /i =  0 and p = 1 are the only stationary points; moreover, 
p = 0 is a global attractor for the dynamics, i.e. p —► 0 for every 
initial condition po ^  1;
b) if 0 < pt < 2<5<r2/( l  +  r)2, p lies in the interior of the one­
dimensional simplex and is a global attractor, i.e., p —» p for every 
Po ±  0,1;
c) if pt > 2<5cr2/ ( l  +  r)2, p — 0 and p — 1 are again the only stationary 
points and p — 1 is a global attractor for the dynamics, i.e., p —> 1 
for every po ^  1.
Let now (3t > 1/2. Then
d) if pt < 0. P = 1 is now the global attractor, i.e.p —> 1 for every
Po ^  0,
e) if 0 < pt < 26o2/(1 + r)2, p is a repellor and p = 0, p =  1 are 
attractors; moreover, p —> 0 whenever po 6 [0, 28o2/( l  +  r)2) and 
p —> 1 whenever po € (2i$<72/(1 + r)2, 1];
f) if Pt > 2(5ct2/(1 + r)2, p = 0 is a global attractor, i.e., p —> 0 for 
every p0 ±  1.
g) finally, if {3” = 1/2, p will stay at its initial value po, whatever 
po € [0,1].
The proof of Proposition 2 is reported in section 2 of the Appendix.
6. In terpretation  o f th e results.
In this section we analyze in detail Proposition 2 as well as its 
implications for the permanence of noise traders. A first important
puts it in the interior of the one-dimensional simplex, p is separated 
from p =  0 and we have one more stationary point in which rational 
and noise traders coexist. In this case, either p — 0 or p =  1 must be 
an attractor for the replicator dynamics, but not both. Moreover, there 
is also one attracting and one repelling stationary point where rational 




























































































insight into our results comes from the geometry of our model, which 
we now discuss.
Let us begin from the case ft/ > 1/2.
For pt > 26a2/(I  + r)2, ft lies outside the one-dimensional simplex, 
to the right of p =  1, which is a repellor. At pt — 26a2/( l  -f r)2, ft 
crosses the frontier of the one-dimensional simplex and coincides with 
p — 1 (see Figure la).
For 0 < pt < 26a2/(1 + r)2, ft belongs to the interior of the one­
dimensional simplex. A new stationary point which was previously ‘cap­
tured’ by p = 1 now emerges. Moreover, since in this range both p = 1 
and p — 0 are attractors, p must be a repellor (see Figure lb). In 
other words, p is the separatrix between the attraction basins of the 
two stable stationary points p = 0 and p = 1.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
As pt comes closer to 0, ft comes closer to p = 0. This means 
that the basin of attraction of p — 0 is shrinking and that of p — 1 is 
stretching. At pt = 0, p is now ‘captured’ by p = 0, whose basin of 
attraction has completely disappeared; p = 0 is therefore now a repellor 
(see Figure lc).
We come now to the case ft/ < 1/2.
Again as before, for pt > 26a2p/{ \ + r)2, ft lies outside the unit 
simplex, at the right of p = 1, which, however, is now an attractor. At 
pt = 26a2/(1 + r)2, p crosses p — 1 (see Figure 2a).
As 0 < pt < 26a/J( 1 + r)2, p enters the interior of the unit simplex. 
p is now an attractor, whose basin of attraction coincides with the 
interior of the unit simplex; accordingly, p = 0 and p = 1 are repellors 
(see Figure 2b). In other words, as p crosses p — 1, it ‘steals’ the 
stability of the latter and turns it into a repellor.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
Finally, as pt crosses 0, p crosses p = 0, which now becomes an 
attractor; i.e., for pt < 0 not only p = 0 absorbs ft but also ‘steals’ in 
turn the basin of attraction of the latter, thus becoming an attractor 




























































































To sum up, as pt decreases along the real line two different patterns 
of behavior emerge for the cases /3" > 1/2 and /3" < 1/2. In the former, 
we observe the continuous stretching of the basin of attraction of p =  1 
and, consequently, the shrinking of that of p =  0 (the opposite is of 
course true if pt increases); in the latter, we observe two exchanges of 
stability, first from p = 1 to p and, subsequently, from p to p =  0 (once 
again, the order is reversed if pt increases).
So far for the technical meaning of our results. As to their inter­
pretation, the first thing to remark is that Proposition 2 draws a basic 
distinction between the case where rational traders initially hold the 
majority of the noisy stock and the case where noise traders do. When 
noise traders initially hold the minority of the noisy stock, it is required 
that the misperception in period t be bullish if noise traders are to be ob­
served in equilibrium at the beginning of period t-\-1. More specifically, 
if it is only moderately bullish in the sense made precise by Proposi­
tion 2, rational and noise traders coexist in equilibrium; if they are very 
bullish, the market is eventually made up of noise traders. When noise 
traders initially hold the majority of the noisy stock, it is instead re­
quired that the misperception be bearish or only moderately bullish. 
In the former case, only noise traders are observed in equilibrium; in 
the latter, the same happens if the initial proportion of noise traders 
is high enough; otherwise, only rationed traders are observed. Finally, 
if the misperception is very bullish, noise traders are never observed in 
equilibrium.
The economic sense of these conditions is rather clear [see also 
the discussion in DSSW (1990b; sections IC, IIA)]. Assume that noise 
traders initially hold the majority of the noisy stock (/?" > 1/2). If 
noise traders are currently very bullish and hold the majority of the 
stock, its price rises considerably and therefore reduces noise traders’ 
return to risk bearing substantially. This is related to what DSSW call 
the ‘price pressure’ effect. Moreover, if noise traders are currently very 
bullish and hold a lot of the stock, they run a substantial risk of suffer­
ing from a large capital loss; in the DSSW terminology, this is the result 
of the ‘buy high sell low’ effect. As a result, no noise traders will be 
observed in equilibrium. If on the other hand the current misperception 
is only moderately bullish, and if the initial proportion of noise traders 




























































































is not as high as before, and it is shared among a number of traders 
that is large enough to make noise trading attractive. If on the other 
hand the initial proportion of noise traders is small and nevertheless 
they hold the majority of the noisy stock, even with moderately bullish 
misperceptions noise trading is still a very risky business because price 
risk must be shared among a small number of traders. Consequently, no 
noise traders are observed in equilibrium; i.e., the ‘create space’ effect is 
still overwhelmed by the ‘price pressure’ and ‘buy high sell low’ effects. 
Finally, if noise traders are currently bearish and nevertheless hold the 
majority of the stock, noise trading becomes very attractive because 
there is now the possibility of large capital gains at a relatively low risk. 
This possibility accounts for the disappearance of rational traders in 
equilibrium; it conflicts somewhat, however, with the fourth and last 
effect considered by DSSW in their paper, namely the ‘hold more’ ef­
fect. Equation (5) above suggests that, on the average, noise traders 
hold relatively more of the noisy stock when their average mispercep­
tions are bullish than when they are bearish; a consequence of this fact 
is that the difference in expected returns between noise and rational 
trading can never be positive if noise traders have bearish expectations 
on the average, because in this case they hold a relatively low amount of 
the noisy stock and the returns to risk bearing accrue more to rational 
than to noise traders [see DSSW (1990b), pp. 714-5]. This of course 
suggests that noise traders should eventually disappear when their mis­
perceptions are bearish. In our dynamic model, however, noise traders 
may ‘hold more’ of the noisy stock than rational traders despite their 
currently bearish misperception; it is in fact true that whenever this 
happens, rational traders disappear in equilibrium. To understand this 
difference between our results and those of DSSW, it is important to 
stress how average misperceptions, and therefore the ‘hold more’ effect 
itself, play no role in the determination of the equilibrium distribution 
of types in our model; only the current misperceptions matter. As a 
consequence, the fact that ‘on the average’ noise traders buy relatively 
less of the noisy stock when their expectations are bearish than when 
they are bullish has no clear implication in terms of the final outcome of 
each single round of fictitious trade. Another reason for the difference 
between our results and those of DSSW is that, as we have already re­




























































































in expected returns, but the difference between the expected return to 
each type and the average expected return, which gives rise to a more 
complex dynamic interaction than that of the DSSW model.
On the basis of the above discussion, the interpretation of the sta­
bility conditions for the case /3” < 1/2 is not difficult. When noise 
traders initially hold the minority of the noisy stock, if their misper­
ception is very bullish noise trading may create its own space without 
increasing price risk excessively; this makes noise trading very attrac­
tive and therefore no rational traders are observed in equilibrium. If 
the misperception is only moderately bullish, it is necessary that the 
expected returns to noise trading, which are now relatively modest, are 
shared among a relatively small number of traders for it to be attrac­
tive. Hence, rational and noise traders coexist in equilibrium. Finally, 
if the misperception is bearish, noise trading is not profitable because 
traders now face a low chance of a capital gain while still facing a non- 
negligible amount of price risk; hence, no noise traders are observed in 
equilibrium.
7. C onclusion: D ynam ics m atters.
It is a standard result that if the payoff function is linear in the 
distribution of population types, any ESS is an asymptotically stable 
state for the replicator dynamics [see Hofbauer, Schuster and Sygmund 
(1979)]. Thus, whenever the above linearity assumption is met, static 
analysis based on the ESS solution concept tells us a good deal about the 
dynamic behavior of types under a replicator dynamics. This assump­
tion is unfortunately not met in our model, as it can be readily checked 
from equations (11), (12): The variability of noise traders’ mispercep­
tions causes a quadratic dependence of types’ returns on the distribution 
of types. As a consequence, on an a priori basis there is no reason to 
suspect that a static evolutionary analysis based on the ESS solution 
concept may be a good substitute for a dynamic one. Our results prove 
that this suspect is indeed a reality. The predictions of the static and 
the dynamic analysis about the eventual disappearance of noise traders 
in equilibrium are in fact very different; in fact, a static evolutionary 




























































































Let us see this point in more detail. We have shown that p =  0 is 
an ESS whatever the noise traders’ misperceptions; however, it is not 
always an attractor for the replicator dynamics. Also, we have seen that 
p = 1 is an ESS for 0 < p< < 2<5<t2/(1 + r)2; dynamic analysis reveals, 
however, that when the current noise traders’ misperception is in the 
above mentioned range p = 1 is an attractor for the replicator dynam­
ics only if a) noise traders hold the majority of the noisy stock; and 
b) the initial proportion of noise traders is large enough (more specifi­
cally, larger than p)18. Moreover, whereas static analysis rules out the 
possibility that noise traders are observed in equilibrium if their mis­
perceptions are bearish, dynamic analysis shows that only noise traders, 
however bearish, will be observed in equilibrium if noise traders initially 
hold the majority of the noisy stock. Finally, although no ESS where 
rational and noise traders coexist can be found, coexistence of rational 
and noise trading can emerge as a stable equilibrium of the replicator 
dynamics for a certain range of values of noise traders’ misperception 
and for a certain initial distribution of the noisy stock between ratio­
nal and noise traders. (It is worth remarking that, when rational and 
noise traders coexist in equilibrium, the actual proportion of the two 
types varies with the current noise traders’ misperception p<.) In fact, 
the very same distribution of types p which can be an attractor for the 
replicator dynamics was also a candidate for an ESS, but it did not pass 
the test.
The answers we get from a dynamic evolutionary analysis are, ap­
parently, much more precise and insightful than the ones provided by a 
static one. We therefore conclude that only a dynamic analysis allows 
us to appreciate fully the conditions for noise traders’ permanence in a 
stock market. Our ambition is now that of framing the results of this 
paper into a broader context where the difficult question of the even­
tual survival of noise traders in the long run is tackled in full generality, 
along the lines described in section 2. This hard task we leave for future 
research.
18This second requirement is also present, even if somewhat loosely, in 




























































































A p p e n d i x
1. P ro o f o f P rop osition  1.
Part a).
From equation (8), one has
(Al)
It is clear that when the population is all made up of rational 
traders, p = 0 and, from (Al), one has that Et [7r(^>,q[l ■ <?!>])] =  0 
(remember that the population is large). On the other hand, as to 
Et[7r(^,7[l • <?!>])] one has that
Et[Tr(il>,7[1 • 0])] = liml £<{/?" • [r + Et{pt+1) -  (1 + r)pt]} (A2)
Remembering that r + Et(pt+i ) — (1 + r)pt = 28p2a2/ ( \  + r)2 — 
ppt [this is equation (16) of DSSW(1990b)], we obtain through simple 
algebraic manipulations
In order to prove part a) of the Proposition, recalling conditions 
E1-E2, we must simply prove that £)[7t(i/>,7 [ 1 • </>])] — E t[ir((f),7(1 • >̂])] 
remains strictly negative for every possible value of pt. Given that the 
latter term is zero, this quantity is simply equal to (A3). As p —► 0, the 
first term of (A3) tends to zero, whereas the second tends to pt. The 
third term is more complex to analyze. It is however easy to check that
Et[n(ip, 7[1 • </>])] =
+ (1 — 2 p)pt —( l - p ) ( l  + r)2p2 26a2pp (A3)
lim/i—»0






























































































Since Et[ir{ip ̂ {{-(p])] is C°° for p 6 (0,1], we can therefore conclude 
that it must stay below zero in a (right) neighborhood of p = 0 whatever 
the value of pt. This completes the proof.
Part b)
Following the same line of reasoning of part a) of the proof, one 
can show that
Et[ir{<p,y[l ■ ip])] = 26al ^ 2 o . . „  , (1 + r )2/9?(1 + r)2
By the same token, it turns out that
— 2 ppt + 2Sa2
Et[Tr(ip,^[i • V»])]





Thus, one can write the quantity Et[ir((p,i[l-ip])\ — Et['K(ip,'y[\-tp])}
(1 + r)2
(p2 -  1) -  (2p -  1 )pt + (1 + r)2p?26a2p (A7)
Now, from the definition of an ESS it follows that the values of 
pt for which p — 1 is an ESS are those values for which Et[Tr((j), yfl • 
V>])] — Et[ir(ip, 7[1 •V’])] is less then zero for p(pt) in a (left) neighborhood 
of one. The limiting values p* of pt for which this holds true will be 
those for which p(p*) =  1. Clearly, given the notation adopted in the 





It is easy to check that (A8) is verified whenever
(A8)
0 < pt < 2(1 + r)2 (A9)
This completes the proof.
Part c)
Let us assume that there is an ESS at p, 0 < p < 1. Then a 




























































































the Bishop-Cannings theorem; see Maynard Smith (1982)] is that, for 
every couple of strategies <j>, ip which are played with positive frequence 
at the ESS one must have
Et[K(<p,l[pL -ip® ( l -  ft)- <£])] = Et[it(xp,i\jj, ■ ip® (1 -  ft) • </>])] (A10) 
Simple algebraic manipulations show that this implies in our case
that
(1 + r)2p2t 
2 Sal
( 1 - m  ® r f p \  
26ajfi -  P i -  0
from which it easily follows that
(A ll)
r. _  (l + r)2Pt 
*
is the unique candidate to a ‘mixed’ ESS. To decide whether or not 
it is an ESS we have to test its stability w.r.t. small perturbations of 
the distribution of population types. This amounts to imposing some 
sort of stability condition on expected payoffs in a neighborhood of ft. 
Condition E2 in the standard definition of an ESS will not do, however, 
because all feasible strategies are played with positive frequency at fi. 
The choice of the stability condition is therefore somewhat arbitrary; a 
reasonable candidate is the following:
dEt [ir(<p,j[il - i p®(  1 -  p) ■ (p})) 
dp




The interpretation of these conditions is as follows: If a type of 
trader tends to be in excess of the equilibrium proportion in a small 
neighborhood of /i, the return from adopting that type descreases and 
the return from adopting the other type increases; this should restore 
the equilibrium proportion.




























































































(1 + r)2 (A15)
Plugging (A12) into (A15), the condition boils down to 2pt — 2pt = 
0, i.e., condition (A13) is satisfied only weakly.
On the other hand, (A14) implies
-  2Pi >  0
, (l +  r ) V
(1 + r)2 p t+  26a2p2 < 0





which is never met.
We can therefore conclude that p fails the stability test for an ESS. 
This completes the proof.
2. P ro o f o f P roposition  2.
Our replicator dynamics takes place on the one-dimensional sim­
plex. This rules out the possibility of cyclic and of chaotic behavior that 
require, respectively, a two-dimensional and a three-dimensional state 
space. Besides limiting considerably the number of possible behaviors 
of the dynamics, the fact that the state space is one-dimensional greatly 
simplifies the analysis. It is easy to understand that the global behavior 
of the dynamics on a one-dimensional state space is easily reconstructed 
by ‘glueing’ together local behaviors in the neighborhoods of the sta­
tionary points. This feature of the model is a consequence of the fact 
that only one type of noise traders exists. With more than one type of 
noise traders, the state space would have a dimension larger than one 
and the global analysis of the dynamics would be considerably more 
difficult.
It is moreover easy to check that our dynamics is smooth, i.e., it 
is differentiable up to any order. This implies that a complete charac­




























































































the stationary points [see e.g. Hirsch and Smale (1974)]. The gradient 
Jn(n) of the dynamics (15) is given by:
Un) = f ^ )  = (2A” -  !){(2̂  -  -  Ptî + ̂  -  P^TTr}
(A18)
H =  0 is a critical point for the dynamics; i.e., 0) =  0. It is
however a nondegenerate critical point, i.e., the second derivative of // 
evaluated in p = 0 is nonzero. This means that the local properties of 
7] at zero are determined by the second derivative of 7/ at ft =  0, that 
we write J%(p) and is found to be
J2V( 0) = f ( 0 )  = m  -  1 )Pt (A19)









If J,2(0)>  0 ,^  = 0 is locally unstable; otherwise, it is locally stable. 
If J^(0) < 0, n = 0 is locally stable19.
When pt = 0, however, J^(0) = 0, p = 0 is a degenerate critical 
point and we have to look at the third derivative of r\ at zero. Routine 
calculations show that
19A geometric intuition for these standard mathematical conditions is 
the following. If J^(0) > 0, the graph of rj cuts the horizontal axis 
‘from below’; in the reverse case, it cuts the axis ‘from above’. See also 





























































































As before, p = 0 is locally unstable if .7/(0) > 0, and locally stable 
in the opposite case20. Therefore, we have that if pt — 0, p = 0 is locally 
stable whenever /3” > 1/2, and locally unstable whenever /3" < 1/2.
So far for p = 0. We have now to calculate the gradient of T) at 
p = 1. One obtains
J v (0) =  4 (2 /3 ? - l ) ^ ; ^ +  1]
Jn(l) = ( l - 2 f t ) [ j j - ^ - p t ]  (A23)
from which it follows that if pt ^  28a2p/( \  + r)2, Jr](1) /  0 and p =  1 is 
a regular point of rp more specifically, Jn( 1) > 0 if either
or
' An > 12
Pt >
26^
( 1 + r ) 2
(A24)
An < è
<  ( 1 + r ) 2
If however = 26ap/ ( l  + r)2, p = 1 is a critical point and we have 
to check the sign of .7/ ( 1 ). One obtains
<5 ^
J2(l) = 2(1 -  + 1] (A26)
which implies that .7/(1) > 0 for /3(n < 1/2.
Finally, we should compute the gradient of // at /Ì. This computa­
tion is rather cumbersome; it is however not necessary since it is easily 
checked that the local geometry of the dynamics at p can be recon­
structed from the information we already possess when p it hes in the 
interior of the one-dimensional simplex.
As to the special case /3" = 1/2, a simple inspection of equation 
(17) shows that in this case rj(p) = 0, i.e., there is actually no dynamics




























































































at all and the system never leaves its initial position //(), whatever it is. 
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